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BRITISH AIRWAYS: CULTURE AND STRUCTURE 
 
Irena Grugulis and Adrian Wilkinson 
 
Today, nearly twenty years after the publication of the (in)famous In Search of 
Excellence, the notion of „cultural change‟ within organisations continues to excite 
attention.  This continuing attraction is readily understood, since cultural interventions 
offer practitioners the hope of a universal panacea to organisational ills and academics 
an explanatory framework that enjoys the virtues of being both partially true and 
gloriously simple. Such a combination is apparent in the way that many attempts to 
shape organisational culture are presented to the public:  as simple stories with happy 
endings (see among others, Peters and Waterman, 1982; Peters and Austin, 1985; 
Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Pfeffer 1994, 1998). 
 
To a certain extent, of course, any form of narration encourages a story, an ending, 
and, as a result, a simplification (Watson, 1999; Wray-Bliss, 2001) and stories may be 
used to shed light on attitudes and understandings not otherwise easily available to the 
researcher (Gabriel, 1991; Watson, 2000). But there is a very significant difference 
between listening to the accounts that individuals tell in order to make sense of their 
lives and allowing the study of the workplace to become „fictionalised‟. The former 
involves engaging with the „subjects‟ of the research, attempting to understand their 
world view and allowing them a voice in the process they are participating in. The 
latter can mean a selective reading of the data with examples chosen because they 
illustrate pre-set conclusions. 
 
 2 
In management particularly the capacity of writers to turn case studies into 
celebratory fictions is worrying.  As Marchington (1995) argues, too many texts focus 
on “fairy tales and magic wands” (see also Harvey-Jones, 1989: 1).  Such an emphasis 
encourages the belief that what is important in the workplace is not context, structure, 
power, economics or industrial relations but whatever new initiative management 
have chosen to introduce (the "magic wands"). The form that this magic takes varies 
from intervention to intervention but the impact claimed for each is curiously similar 
with unproductive workplaces turned around and reluctant employees transformed 
into enthusiasts. Any changes that take place are seen to be a direct result of the magic 
and most are exaggerated.  As a result, research into management becomes research 
into a series of fads and fashions (Kieser, 1996) with Total Quality Management or 
Business Process Re-engineering or employee involvement or culture vying for 
attention and every intervention presented as new. So academic understanding of the 
workplace starts afresh each time a guru develops a new magic wand.  Lessons cannot 
be carried forward since BPR is not employee involvement and company culture is 
not TQM. Elements of the workplace that might have provided a crucial element of 
continuity are ignored or dismissed as unimportant since only change is magical.  As 
a result, by relying on these accounts, we understand less and less about why 
organisations function in the way that they do and practitioners are encouraged to 
believe that each initiative starts with a blank sheet, entirely unconstrained by what 
has gone before. 
 
Accordingly, in this article we attempt to rescue a fairy-tale.  The story of British 
Airways is one of the most widely used inspirational accounts of changing culture 
(Heller, 1992). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s it was used to demonstrate the 
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necessary compatibility of pleasure and profits (see among many others, Georgiades 
and Macdonnell, 1998; Barsoux and Manzoni, 1997a, 1997b; Salama, 1994; Gabel, 
1994; Leahey and Kotter, 1990; Dana, 1998; Schneider and Bowen, 1995; Goldsmith 
and Clutterbuck, 1984).  In these, culture change is presented as the only explanation 
for the transformation that occurred. This corrective makes no attempt to deny the 
very substantial changes that took place in BA. Rather, it sets these in context noting 
the organisation‟s environment at the time of the transformation, the structural 
changes that took place and observing the impact that such changes had over the long 
term (see also Blyton and Turnbull, 1998, Legge, 1994, 1995; Colling, 1995). 
 
Managing Culture: Promises and Problems 
 
In many respects, managing culture is peculiarly susceptible to being presented as a 
corporate fiction.  While other management initiatives seek to promote positive 
attitudes by increasing employees‟ area of responsibility through empowerment 
(Wilkinson, 1998) aligning their financial interests with those of the organisation 
through adjustments to the payment system (Kessler, 1995) or demonstrating an 
organisational commitment to its „human assets‟ by investing in training (Keep, 
1989); cultural change targets employee attitudes directly and aims to secure 
„commitment‟ rather than „resigned behavioural compliance‟ (Ogbonna, 1992/1993) 
with all employees sharing a „common vision‟ and working together for the good of 
the organisation. 
 
As a result, the managerial task becomes one that involves establishing control over 
the meaning of work, rather than its execution (Mitchell, 1985), of „converting‟ 
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employees to the corporate „faith‟. In the words of Peters and Waterman (1982 p xxv) 
managers‟ jobs become “more fun.  Instead of brain games in the sterile ivory tower, 
it's shaping values and reinforcing through coaching and evangelism in the field – 
with the worker in support of the cherished product”.  When the managerial task is to 
inspire and enthuse, it follows that, if management academics are management‟s 
advocates and apologists (cf. Storey, 1985) their task is to provide prescriptions, 
exemplars and celebrations.  Such accounts exist to provoke an emotional response 
and provide a spur to action and, to fulfil these functions, must necessarily describe 
productive interventions.  In this narrative tradition management fads and fashions 
can only succeed. 
 
So, not only is culture as a topic particularly likely to be represented as fiction, but 
also management writers may see their role as essentially celebratory.  For those who 
read case studies to be inspired and enthused this combination is probably welcome.  
Others, who seek to understand the way organisations function; assess the impact of 
interventions on employees; consider how structural and strategic factors combine; or 
even (through their writing) contribute towards a wider, emancipatory agenda; prefer 
accounts that do not automatically seek to report triumphs.  In these, the management 
of culture is depicted as something rather more complex than a 'magic wand', 
„successes‟ are more than counter-balanced by initiatives with mixed or negative 
results and interventions are not assumed to be permanent 'fixes' (Kunda, 1992; 
Grugulis et al., 2000; Collinson, 1992; Storey, 1992; Hamper, 1992; Rosenthal et al, 
1997; Legge, 1994, 1995; Watson, 1994). 
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Occasionally the failures of culture management programmes are comic, Collinson 
(1992) argues that many of the initiatives designed by one British factory‟s (new, 
American) management served only to inspire shop-floor humour including 
stigmatising the company newsletter as „Goebel‟s Gazette‟.  Hamper‟s (1992) account 
of his time at General Motors included the story of the quality cat „howie makem‟ 
whose job was to patrol the factory exhorting workers to produce higher quality.  The 
General Motors‟ employees reacted to this by producing their own „quantity cat‟ who 
(fittingly) chased „howie makem‟ off the factory floor.  And British employees of the 
Gap, a US-owned clothes chain, produced their own version of the organisation‟s 
mission statements (see Fig. 1):  
The Gap 





Every difference makes a difference 
 
Own it, do it, done it 
 
Less is more . . . simplify 
 
Take the smart risk 
 
Do it better every day 
 
Do the right thing 
The Gap 
Words to live by 
Staff Contributions in Italics 
 
Everyone counts the days until they leave 
 
Every difference makes a difference 
apart from indifference 
 
Own it, do it, done it EH? 
 
Our wages Less is more . . . simplify 
 
Take the smart risk and quit 
 
Do it better every day and still feel shit 
 
Do the right thing and leave 
Fig 1. The Gap, Words to Live By 
Other accounts of cultural interventions are less amusing.  Keenoy and Anthony 
(1992) note that shortly after the TSB launched its culture change programme (which 
aimed to construct an 'achievement orientated culture') it announced that some 5,000 
staff were to be made redundant; and Ogbonna and Wilkinson's (1988, 1990) research 
into culture change in supermarkets describes practices that are very stressful for the 
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checkout operators told to implement them.  In many organisations, it seems, cultural 
interventions are simply a form of work intensification (Anthony, 1994; Wray, 2000).  
 
Significantly each of these references differs from the celebrations in their willingness 
to believe that culture‟s impact on employees is not automatically positive.  This is 
not to argue that cultural interventions are never welcomed.  Kunda (1992), Casey 
(1995), Kidder (1981) and Grugulis et al. (2000) all describe environments in which 
enthusiastic staff welcomed the management of culture (though in each case the 
impact of this was problematic).  Watson‟s (1994) managers viewed ZCT‟s corporate 
culture changes with a mixture of hope and scepticism; and Storey (1992) notes that, 
while little sympathy was forthcoming from the shop floor, several line managers 
were supportive. 
 
Going beyond the prescriptive accounts to understand organisations also raises 
questions on the efficacy of culture in securing „bottom line‟ benefits.  This coaching, 
evangelism and conversion, what Reed (1992, p. 205) describes as a shift from 
“control by repression to control by seduction” is done because it is assumed that 
employee commitment equates to higher profits.  In part because employees will now 
invest their energy, enthusiasm and ideas without constraint (see, for example, Kunda, 
1992; Kidder, 1981; Grugulis et al, 2000); and in part because work is being re-
defined in emotional rather than productive terms (Hochschild, 1983; Fineman, 2000).  
In practice, of course, the link between a unitary culture and corporate profits is 
elusive (Legge, 1995).  Indeed, not only is the failure of organisations actively 
engaged in culture management and high commitment work practices notable, but 
also anti-managerial cultures seem just as capable of fostering high levels of output as 
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more consensual ones (see, for example, Burawoy, 1979; Ackroyd and Crowdy, 
1990). 
 
The British Airways Story 
 
Even by the standards of modern management myths the British Airways 
transformation is impressive. At the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s BA 
was performing disastrously against almost every indicator.  An old fleet made for 
uncomfortable journeys and contributed significantly to the airline‟s record for 
unpunctuality (Corke, 1986); its productivity was considerably below that of its main 
overseas competitors (Warhurst, 1995); it was beset by industrial disputes; and it was 
recording substantial financial losses (£140 million or some £200 a minute in 1981).  
It seemed that staff discontent was more than matched by customer disatisfaction and 
in 1980 a survey by the International Airline Passengers‟ Association put BA at the 
top of a list of airlines to be avoided at all costs (Blyton and Turnbull, 1998).  By 
1996 this picture was reversed.  Not only had BA become the world‟s most profitable 
carrier, it was also voted the company that most graduates would like to work for 
(Financial Times 9
th
 July 1997) and, by the year 2000, another survey declared it the 
second most admired company in Europe (Financial Times, 18th March 2000). 
 
Much of the management literature attributes this turnaround to BA‟s own cultural 
change which remodelled staff attitudes and set customer care as the primary focus of 
activity (see, among others, Georgiades and Macdonnell, 1998; Barsoux and 
Manzoni, 1997a; 1997b; Salama, 1994; Gabel, 1994; Leahey and Kotter, 1990).  As 
Doyle (1999 p. 20) noted:  
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In the 80s BA had been transformed from a disastrous loss-making state 
enterprise - the British Rail of the sky - into the world's largest and most 
profitable international airline.  It was a triumph for management, showing 
that Britain could produce world-class companies that could beat the best of 
the competition.  Its success was the result of the process and strategy that 
management introduced.  The process focused on creating a vision that 
would inspire the BA staff and gain their enthusiastic commitment. 
 
It is certainly true that a great deal of effort and energy went into shaping BA‟s 
culture.  At the heart of this was the „Putting People First‟ training programme 
launched by Colin Marshall, the company‟s new chief executive, in December 1983.  
Originally intended for staff who had direct contact with customers it was, in fact, 
attended by all 40,000 employees by 1986 and it aimed to revolutionise their attitudes.  
In a direct challenge to the hierarchical and militaristic culture which existed in BA at 
the time, staff were instructed not to attend in uniform and, once on the course, put 
into cross-functional and cross-grade groups.  The course itself was consciously 
designed to modify behaviour.  Attendees were encouraged to take a more positive 
attitude to themselves, taught how to set personal goals and cope with stress and 
instructed in confidence building and „getting what they wanted out of life‟ (Young, 
1989).  Lapel badges inscribed with the motto "We're putting people first" provided a 
visible reminder of the course's message. 
 
The approach was self-conciously “indoctrinative” (Bate, 1994 p 195).  As Colin 
Marshall said "We . . . have to 'design' our people and their service attitude just as we 
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design an aircraft seat, an in-flight entertainment programme or an airport lounge to 
meet the needs and preferences of our customers" (cited in Barsoux and Manzoni, 
1997a p. 14 emphasis added). 
 
Colin Marshall‟s own personal commitment is one of the most written-about features 
of the PPF programme.  He attended 95 per cent of all the PPF courses that ran, 
setting out his vision for BA and participating in question and answer sessions with 
staff (Georgiades and Macdonnell, 1998, though this figure is reported as 40 per cent 
in Barsoux and Manzoni, 1997a).  This involvement extended beyond the PPF 
programme. Each time he flew the chief executive would introduce himself to front 
line staff and passengers and discuss their experience of BA.  Once, when a queue 
formed at the launch of a new service he helped to deliver breakfasts to customers 
(Höpfl, 1993).  In his presence all of the symbols of the 'new culture' were expected to 
be in place - even down to the PPF lapel badges.  Staff not wearing one of these had 
replacements pinned in place and Colin Marshall wore his own PPF badge for two 
years (Georgiades and Macdonnell, 1998 p 209). 
 
But the most impressive aspect of BA‟s cultural change is not so much the 
sophistication of the PPF programme itself, nor the commitment of executive time, 
but the extent to which other employment policies and practices were changed to fit 
the „new‟ culture and the continued emphasis on these practices and programmes 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  Three-quarters of the one hundred Customer First 
teams, formed to propagate the message of PPF, survived into the 1990s.  Not only 
were team briefings and team working introduced but these were developed and 
refined with TQM, autonomous team working and multi-skilling introduced in many 
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areas.  Direct contact with all staff was considered so important that „down route‟ 
briefings were developed to ensure that mobile and isolated staff were not neglected 
and in March 1996 BA became the first company to make daily TV broadcasts to its 
staff (Colling, 1995). 
 
The way cabin crew were rostered was also changed.  „Families‟ of staff were created 
to work the same shift patterns.  These were intended to provide mutual support, make 
cabin crew feel happier about their work environments and, as a result, facilitate the 
production of emotional labour (Barsoux and Manzoni, 1997a).  A new role of 
„Passenger Group Co-ordinator‟ was introduced and staff appointed based entirely on 
personal qualities.  The importance of emotional processes was also reflected in the 
new appraisal and reward systems such that work was judged on the way in which it 
was performed as well as against harder targets (Georgiades and Macdonnell, 1998; 
Höpfl, 1993).  Managerial bonuses could be as much as 20 per cent of salary and were 
calculated on a straight 50:50 split between exhibiting desired behaviours and 
achieving quantitative goals.  Awards for Excellence and an Employee Brainwaves 
programme encouraged staff input.  The Personnel Department was renamed „Human 
Resources‟ with many decisions devolved to line managers and, in the first few years 
of the programme at least, a commitment was made to job security. 
 
Closely following these developments, a Managing People First programme targeted 
managerial employees and aimed to bring their behaviours into line with a list 
developed by two consultancy firms (see fig. 2).  As on PPF, the emphasis on this 
five-day course was on quasi-group therapy and experiential exercises.  Outward 
bound courses were also intended to support the re-shaping of personality and the 
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small groups formed on these residential programmes were expected to act as mutual 
support vehicles once back in the workplace. 
 
THE MENU OF PRACTICES 
FACTOR I 
CLARITY AND HELPFULNESS 
FACTOR II 
PROMOTING ACHIEVEMENT 
Establishing clear, specific objectives for 
subordinates 
Emphasising and demonstrating 
commitment to achieving goals 
Helping subordinates to understand how 
their jobs contribute to the overall 
performance of the organisation 
Giving subordinates feedback on how 
they are doing 
Clearly defining standards of excellence 
required for job performance 
Communicating your views to others 
honestly and directly about their 
performance 
Providing help, training and guidance for 
subordinates 
Recognising people more often than 
criticising them 
Giving subordinates a clear-cut decision 
when they need one 
Recognising subordinates for innovation 
and calculated risk taking 
FACTOR III 
INFLUENCING THROUGH 
PERSONAL EXCELLENCE AND 
TEAMWORKING 
FACTOR IV 
CARE AND TRUST 
Knowing and being able to explain to 
others the mission of the organisation and 
how it relates to their jobs 
Behaving in a way that leads others to 
trust you 
Communicating high personal standards 
informally through appearance and 
dedication 
Building warm, friendly relationships 
Noticing and showing appreciation for 
extra effort 
Paying close attention to what people are 
saying 
Sharing power in the interest of achieving 
overall organisation objectives 
Responding non-defensively when others 
disagree with your views 
Willing to make tough decisions in 
implementing corporate strategy 
Making sure that there is a frank and 
open exchange at work group meetings 
Fig. 2  The four factor menu of practices used in British Airways in 1984 – 1985 (Source:  Georgiades 
and Macdonnell, 1998 p 174). 
 
Other courses were developed to maintain the momentum created by Putting People 
First and Managing People First.  These included Winning for Customers, A Day in 
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the Life, To Be the Best, Leading in a Service Business and Leadership 2000 and, 
while each was different, they all shared a focus on shaping staff emotions.  The most 
dramatic form of this was probably the „love bath‟ exercise in one of the early courses 
in which delegates took it in turns to sit in the centre of a circle while their colleagues 
complimented them (see Höpfl, 1993 for an account of participants‟ reactions to this 
process).  Nearly twenty years after the launch of PPF, BA managers attending a 
training course were still being told about understanding themselves and taking 
responsibility: "understanding self is our starting point . . . .  That means that to make 
a change within the airline we need to start with you - what can you do differently?"  
(BA Training Course, Dangerous Company, BBC2 April 2000).  In 1995, Bob 
Ayling, newly taken over from Colin Marshall as chief executive, continued this 
active management of company culture and said of his staff: "I want them to feel 
inspired, I want them to feel optimistic, I want them to feel that this is a good place to 
be" (Dangerous Company, BBC2 April 2000).  
 
Such substantive change certainly seems to justify the plaudits heaped on it.  But, as 
an account, it suffers from a number of flaws.  Most significantly, as Anthony (1994) 
notes, together with other presentations of culture change it neglects structure.  Yet 
the existence of cultural factors do not negate more material ones and there were 
certainly structural reasons for BA‟s success. Colin Marshall‟s emphasis on putting 
people first and caring for one another had been preceded by a rule of fear. BA‟s first 
response to its problems had been a massive series of redundancies, the largest in 
British history at the time, with staff numbers reduced by 40 per cent between 1981 
and 1983 (albeit with generous severance).  Senior staff were not exempt from this 
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process, with 161 being „removed‟ overnight on one memorable occasion in 1983 
(Barsoux and Manzoni, 1997a).  
 
More fundamentally, the company was well provided with slots in Britain‟s 
prestigious Heathrow airport  and faced little competition on many of the routes that it 
served.  European markets were still tightly regulated and market share often 
depended on negotiation skills rather than competitive success.  In 1987 just before 
privatisation, BA controlled some 60 per cent of the UK domestic market and only 
experienced competition on 9 per cent of routes into and out of the UK (Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission, 1987).  Post privatisation its position was actually 
strengthened when it gained a 75 per cent share of domestic routes (Colling, 1995). 
Such was BA's dominance during this period that it could almost charge what it liked 
(The Economist, 18th March 2000).  Moreover, BA built up a series of alliances and 
mergers to consolidate this position (see Colling, 1995, for a full list). 
 
While staff numbers were being drastically cut the infrastructure was dramatically 
improved.  The fact that new uniforms were provided is well covered in the human 
resource and marketing literature.  Less commonly noted is that BA invested in 
control systems, terminal facilities and aircraft. Between 1980 and 1985 BA replaced 
over half their fleet (Colling, 1995).  Computer reservations were introduced; a series 
of hub and spoke routes through first Heathrow and then Gatwick networked flights; 
and selectively focused competitive pricing served to limit what little competition the 
airline faced (Blyton and Turnbull, 1996).  Nor was this the only strategy deployed 
against competitors.  In 1993 BA used shared booking information to persuade Virgin 
customers to transfer to BA, informing them (incorrectly) that Virgin flights were no 
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longer available.  The subsequent court case fined BA £610,000 damages and £3 
million costs (Leake, 1998).  It raised questions about the extent of knowledge and 
invovlement of Lord King, the chairman, Sir Colin Marshall, the chief executive and 
Bob Ayling, the head of marketing (Lloyd, 1997; Kitson and Campbell, 1996) as well 




Not only can much of the BA turnaround be attributed to structural factors, but also 
the extent of the company‟s cultural transformation itself is open to question.  There is 
little doubt that, in theory, cultural change interventions are both manipulative and 
totalitarian (Willmott, 1993) seeking as they do influence and control over the 
thoughts, values, attitudes and norms of others.  Yet such hegemony is easier to 
describe than it is to secure.  Employees are not cultural dupes (Hill, 1995; Keep, 
1989).  Co-operation may reflect ambition or pride in work (Storey, 1992; 
Korczynski, 2001) as much as (or instead of) a belief in the organisation itself.  And 
Höpfl‟s (1993) account of British Airways managers in the „new‟ culture reveals 
hostility and uncertainty as well as enthusiasm.  Further, despite the claims of the 
prescriptive literature, the existence of 'culture management' does not ensure either 
that employees trust management, or that management trusts employees. So, in BA, 
„new‟ management practices varied in the extent that they were introduced in 
departments (Salama, 1994) and conflict between employees and management did not 
cease.  Even at the point at which the company's unified culture was being heralded as 




Nor was the much vaunted job security quite as robust as it seemed.  Alliances, 
mergers and franchising agreements with other airlines already supported what was, 
in effect a 'tiered' system of terms and conditions with employees based at Heathrow 
privileged over those in the regional airports (Colling, 1995).  This emphasis on part-
time, seasonal and sub-contracted work was extended to most aspects of BA's 
operations.  Its engine overhaul plant was sold off to GEC; data processing work was 
moved to Bombay; and job security for existing staff questioned (Warhurst, 1995; 
Blyton and Turnbull, 1996; Colling, 1995).  And all this at a time when BA was 
making record profits. 
 
So, to re-cast our fairy-tale in rather more prosaic terms, BA, while clearly putting a 
great deal of effort into encouraging certain behaviours from (or „designing‟) staff did 
not base its employment policies and practices around the new culture in the way that 
many accounts suggest.  Their array of 'soft' human resource management techniques 
was certainly impressive but not everyone benefitted from them and those employed 
in partner, assoicate, merged or taken-over firms often experienced very different 
terms and condidtions to the 'core' BA staff. 
 
Nor is it fair to conclude, as many accounts do, with optimism about staff reactions to 
'culture change'.  There was enthusiasm and acceptance certainly, but there was also 
doubt, concern, opposition and open cynicism (Höpfl, 1993).  Such indiviudal 
reactions were mirrored by the collective  representations and the persistence of 
disputes even at the height of the cultural success.  As Colling (1995 p 25) argues 
“The relatively high incidence of conflict throughout the period fuels doubts about a 
transformation in the culture of the company towards the mutual commitment model".   
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The 1997 Dispute: Change or Continuity? 
 
By the end of the 1990s many of the structural factors that had provided the basis for 
the company‟s success were under threat. The emergence of low cost carriers such as 
Easyjet and Ryanair were undercutting BA‟s prices and, elsewhere, alliances between 
rivals Lufthansa and United Airlines ensured that cross national traffic would be less 
likely to transfer to BA.  The company‟s hold on Heathrow was also loosening under 
double pressure from Europe and the USA.  In response, Ayling claimed BA needed a 
second revolution.  BA sought its own alliance with a different US carrier, American 
Airlines which came under the (unhurried) scrutiny of regulators in both Brussels and 
the USA, as well as proposing £1 billion of cost savings from within the organisation, 
with the aim of doubling profits by the year 2000.  Much of this was to come from 
staff savings including 5,000 voluntary redundancies with staff to be replaced by 
newly hired employees on lower pay (Blyton and Turnbull, 1998).  In addition, BA 
established links with a charter airline called Flying Colours intending to continue its 
policy of outsourcing to other operators. 
 
This policy of reducing labour costs was also extended to 'core' BA staff.  In early 
1997, BA attempted to change the structure of payments to cabin crew. It was 
proposed that the existing employees would be „bought out‟ of their series of 
allowances (petrol, overnight stay etc) by receiving a higher basic wage.  BA offered 
a three year guarantee that no crew member would earn less under the new system but 
nothing beyond that and it was clear to cabin crew staff that the measure was 
launched with the explicit aim of saving money.  When these negotiations failed, one 
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union, the TGWU, threatened strike action (Cabin Crew 89, a small breakaway union, 
had already accepted management‟s offer).  Despite fourteen years of „indoctrination‟ 
into caring for one another and putting people first, the tactics deployed by BA‟s 
management were described by two such different sources as the TUC and The 
Economist as bullying (Taylor, 1998; The Economist 27
th
 July 1997).  Members of the 
cabin crew were warned not to strike and BA managers were instructed to tell 
discontented staff that anyone taking industrial action would be summarily sacked, 
then sued for damages.  Any who simply stayed away would face disciplinary action, 
be denied promotion, and lose both pension rights and staff discounts on flights for 
three years.  BA were also reported to be filming pickets. 
 
The subsequent strike ballot had an 80 per cent turnout with 73 per cent of employees 
voting in favour of strike action. The TGWU called a series of 72-hour strikes with 
the first action scheduled for 9th July 1997.  In response, temporary staff and an 
alternative workforce of „volunteer managers‟ were given a (probably inadequate) 
training to perform the key tasks of the ground handling staff (The Herald 26
th
 June 
1997) and BA threatened to take legal action over claimed discrepancies in the ballot.  
On the eve of the first day of action airline cabin crew were telephoned at home and 





These managerial actions certainly influenced the impact of the strike.  On the first 
scheduled day of action less than three hundred workers declared themselves 
officially on strike but more than 2,000 called in sick.  The company‟s threats and 
„replacement workers‟ notwithstanding more than 70 per cent of flights from 
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Heathrow were cancelled (The Economist 12
th
 July 1997).  It seemed that BA‟s 
macho approach had ensured only that collective action took the form of collective 
illness. 
 
Ironically this 'mass sickie' served to make things worse for BA.  Not only did the pre-
strike ballots (conducted to comply with legislation designed to discourage union 
activities) compound the effects of the strike by providing customers with advance 
notice of it; but also those employees who had called in sick tended to stay away 
longer than the official 72-hour strike.  BA insisted that sick employees provide a 
doctor‟s note within 48 hours instead of the normal seven days but many employees 
still stayed off for the full two weeks that their sick notes allowed and, throughout this 
period, services were cancelled and passengers turned away (Gribben, 1997).  The 
strike was costly.  Airline seats are a particularly perishable form of consumer good 
and aircraft scheduling is easily disrupted.  When Bill Morris, the General Secretary 
of the TGWU announced that he had written to Bob Ayling, suggesting that they 
resume negotiations, Ayling agreed before even receiving the letter. 
 
The TGWU promised to save £42 million over three years.  Catering was sold off but 
existing staff kept earnings and BA staff discounts, while sanctions against strikers 
were withdrawn and the TGWU increased its membership by 50 per cent to over 
10,000.  BA's management fared less well, despite Bob Ayling's claim that this 
agreement marked a 'new beginning and spirit of a cooperation' (The Guardian 13
th
 
September 1999).  The gulf between the managerial rhetoric on culture and official 
actions during the strike had a predictable effect on employee morale.  One 
undercover employee publication, aptly named Chaos advised on ways of maximising 
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payments by delaying aircraft.  These included throwing duvet feathers into the 
engine, superglueing down the toilet seat and poisoning the pilot: “a particularly 
obnoxious captain can be made to suffer all the symptoms of violent food poisoning 
by emptying eye drops from the aircraft medical kit into his salad or drink” (The 
Guardian, 8
th
 November 1997). 
 
Moreover, the agreement itself fostered further dissent.  4,000 staff left by the end of 
1997 but 4,500 more were recruited including 2,000 in 1998.  By the terms of the 
agreement, these new staff were employed on different contracts to existing 
employees.  As a result, cabin crew working the same shifts on the same aircraft were 
(increasingly) on different payscales.  The impact of this on both labour relations and 
BA‟s much prized teamworking was problematic and problems were fuelled by 
suggestions that staff on new contracts were favoured by BA in promotion to purser 
(first line manager). 
 
Bob Ayling attempted to salvage the situation by placing more emphasis on managing 
the company‟s culture.  Following Colin Marshall he addressed staff training sessions 
and held question and answer forums with groups of employees.  This time there were 
few positive reactions.  The strike cost BA £125 million; morale never entirely 
recovered (Dove, 2000); and profits suffered.  Between 1998 and 1999 they fell by 61 
per cent and in 2000 British Airways announced losses of £244 million on its main 
business.  While gains from disposals succeeded in keeping the company out of the 
red this was its worst performance (and first loss) since privatisation.  The new logo 
Bob Ayling had launched (at great expense) during the 1997 dispute was unpopular 
and had to be withdrawn.  These failures so coloured the public perception of the 
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chief executive that even his attempts to refocus BA onto profitable routes and 
introduce a new seat for business class long haul passengers were not entirely 
welcomed.  On March 10
th
 2000, Bob Ayling resigned as chief executive. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Re-presenting our fairy story in case study format shows the company‟s turnaround in 
a different light with international agreements, competition with other airlines, the 
state of the fleet and the network of links between flights making a contribution to 
improved performance that was as least as siginficant as the cultural change 
programme itself.  It is difficult to believe that, without these structural interventions 
BA's profits would have risen in the way that they did (cf. Peters and Waterman, 
1982).  Equally, the structural improvements may have served to enhance the cultural 
messages just as Bob Ayling's "Chicago-style union busting macho management" 
(George Galloway, MP Newsnight 10
th
 July 1997) made his seem hypocritical.  As 
Grugulis et al. (2000) argue in their study of a consultancy firm, it is naïve to assume 
that practices which are effective when companies are successful will be equally 
welcome at other times.  Employees do not 'react' to the management of culture in 
isolation, nor does a 'positive' cultural rhetoric negate problematic experiences of job 
design, dis-empowerment, payment systems or control mechanisms.  Rather, 
responses will be influenced by a person's experience of work as a whole and 
employees are more than capable of noting discrepancies between managerial 
promises and organisational practice. 
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This is not to suggest that BA's cultural change was unimportant.  Indeed, the move to 
„design‟ employees, to shape the way they think and feel about their work rather than 
simply control what they produce is a new development (Edwards, 1995; Willmott, 
1993; Kunda, 1992 among others provide a consideration of its implications; but see 
also Dalton, 1966; Barnard, 1962; Kanter, 1977 for an account of the loyalties 
expected of managerial employees).  A growing service sector and an increasing 
focus on customer service in all industries has resulted in an emphasis on the service 
process (of which the employee is an integral part) rather than a manufactured product 
(see du Gay, 1996; Sturdy, 2001; Nickson et al., 2001).  Clearly such a development 
has and will lead to fundamental changes in the way work is shaped.  But these 
changes are not attempts to make work "more fun".  They represent a new means of 
management control (Reed, 1992) targeted on staff emotions.  So personalities and 
individuals are valued only within pre-determined limits (Bate, 1994). 
 
Employers these days may take the line that they wish employees to express 
themselves and explore their potential, but actually they are interested in this 
sort of capacity only in so far as it is conducive to the benefit of the 
organisation.  They tend to have preconceived ideas about how much and 
what kind of individuality is needed.  They do not, in fact, wish to find too 
much variation from their ideas in this area; nor do they want dissent 
concerning their favoured policies.  Despite an apparent openness, therefore, 
there are things employers are definitely unwilling to countenance or indeed 
listen to. (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999 p102). 
 
 22 
Here, BA's programme of culture change was not an expression of mutual trust and 
reciprocal emotional obligations between the company's employees and its 
management.  Rather, it was an alternative control mechanism and should be 
understood as such.  The way that this control mechanism is implemented and the 
consequences that it has differ from other forms of personal, technical or bureaucratic 
control; but management by culture is not automatically either better or worse than 
other forms of regulation and may inspire varied responses.  Employees may feel 
genuine pride in a culture management programme (Kunda, 1992; Grugulis et al., 
2000) or may desire to use it towards their own ends (Storey, 1992).  Equally they 
may feel embarrassment (Höpfl, 1993) or cynicism (Collinson, 1992); set up active 
opposition (Ackroyd and Crowdy, 1990) or use the culture change as a vehicle for 
misbehaviour (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999) and structural factors may influence 
and inform these responses.  The 'successes' and 'failures' of these interventions are 
not magical, nor do they occur in environments that have no legacy of employee 
relations.  But this point is clearest when case studies are extended beyond anecdote 
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